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In this paper we test whether a reallocation of government budget items can enhance 
long-term GDP growth in a set of European countries. We apply modern panel data 
techniques to the period 1970-2006, and we use three alternative dependent variables in 
a growth regression: economic growth, total factor productivity and labour productivity. 
Our results are able to identify also the distortions induced by public expenditure in the 
private factors allocation. In particular, we detect a strong crowding-in effect associated 
to public investment, which have enhanced economic growth by boosting private 
investment. We also associate a significant dependence of productivity on public 
expenditure on education as well as the role of social security and health issues in 
growth and the labour market. 
 
Keywords: economic growth, panel models, fiscal policy. 
 






















The role of fiscal policies on economic growth has driven several studies both on the 
theoretical and empirical on the empirical fronts. The subject is quite relevant, since the 
development of appropriate fiscal policies could lead to a persistent increase on 
economic growth. Therefore, governments need to know whether their public activities 
serve as an incentive to growth or if they represent an obstacle.  
 
The link between the composition of government expenditure and revenue and 
economic growth has been the focus of recent developments in the endogenous growth 
theory. Some authors have proposed different channels through which public 
expenditure and taxation could affect economic growth and productivity. In particular, 
fiscal policy has been assumed to be able to affect production by altering the pattern of 
consumption and investment of the economy. This can occur via the introduction of 
incentives and disincentives in the utility and productivity of the individuals that affect 
the equilibrium in the labour market, and, in the case of government expenditure, also as 
a separate input that comes in the production function. We also want to consider this 
debate in the empirical analysis by comparing the results of using three alternative 
dependent variables in the estimation of a growth regression: economic growth, total 
factor productivity (TFP) and labour productivity. 
 
Under the denomination of endogenous growth models, in the last decade a large strand 
of literature includes a variety of fiscal variables under diverse forms and with 
heterogeneous consequences. Nevertheless, there are some issues in which economic 
theory seems to have reached a certain level of agreement, for example the role of 
public capital on growth or the perverse effect of capital taxation relative to other types 
of taxation. We use in this paper a simple theoretical model, in order to summarise the 
key findings of the relationship of public expenditure with economic growth. The model 
will also be useful to give a better interpretation of our estimation results. 
 
As already mentioned, the analysis of the disaggregated government budget may offer 
useful insights about the suitability of items in the budget to promote growth. Therefore, 
we look at both sides of the government budget, considering public revenues and 
economic and functional spending items. By regressing economic growth on budgetary 
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items and on a set of other relevant variables, we evaluate whether the allocation of 
taxes and public expenditures has been useful to promote growth in a panel of European 
countries for the period 1970-2006. We are able to identify the negative impact of 
public consumption and social security contributions on economic growth, and the 
positive impact of public investment. Our regression results point to an overall situation 
of excessive expenditure in the oldest members of the EU in contrast to a negative 
impact of social transfers, subsidies, public wages and direct taxation in the new 
members. On functional expenditure the study points to a negative impact of health and 
social protection expenditures on production and the growth-enhancing behaviour of 
public expenditure in education.  
 
Unlike previous studies, we try to better accommodate our results to the developments 
of economic theory by identifying the channels through which each budgetary category 
may impact on production growth. Our regressions for labour productivity and TFP, as 
alternative dependent variables, reveal that the main impact of fiscal variables comes 
through alterations in the pattern of investment of the economy. We are able to identify 
the existence of a crowding-in effect of public investment into private investment that 
provokes an overall positive effect of public investment on economic growth, despite its 
negative impact on multifactor productivity. Social expenditures and public investment 
seem to also affect the labour market while public consumption and public wages have 

















The traditional neoclassical growth model did not allow for fiscal policies to affect the 
long-term growth rate of the economy. However, several extensions of neoclassical 
growth theory, proposed by Aschauer (1989), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and 
Mendoza et al. (1997) have introduced modifications that allow public expenditure and 
taxation to play a crucial role in long-term economic growth. Under the denomination 
of endogenous growth models there is a large strand of literature that s includes a 
variety of possibilities to model economic growth: from the simple approach of the AK 
technology to models with externalities, interdependence in an open economy to a new 
generation of models with endogenous technical change.1 
     
Fiscal variables have been considered in the related literature in diverse forms and with 
heterogeneous consequences (Corsetti and Roubini, 1996, and Domenech and Garcia, 
2002). Nevertheless, there are some issues in which economic theory seems to have 
reached a certain level of agreement, for example the role of public capital on growth or 
the perverse effect of capital taxation relative to other types of taxation. However, other 
questions are still open for consideration, and a good example is the role of public 
expenditure on human capital accumulation. 
 
The analysis of the disaggregated government budget may offer useful insights about 
the suitability of items in the budget to promote growth. In this paper we look at both 
sides of the budget, public revenues and economic and functional spending items. By 
regressing economic growth on budgetary items and on a set of other relevant variables 
we evaluate whether the allocation of taxes and public expenditures has been useful to 
promote growth in a panel of European countries for the period 1970-2006.  
 
The shortcoming of poor data availability affected the first attempts to use panel data 
models to relate growth and fiscal variables (Barro, 1991, Levine and Renelt, 1992, and 
Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). Recently, the amount and quality of data have improved, 
and the large number of empirical studies about the determinants of economic growth 
provides valuable information about the variables that should be included in such a 
                                                 
1 Acemoglu (2006) includes a detailed explanation of the evolution of endogenous growth models. 
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model and about the interpretation of the estimated coefficients (Kneller et al., 1999, 
Odedokun, 2001, and Bose et al., 2003).    
 
The actual debate includes the choice of the estimation method and the definition of the 
long-term coefficients (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001, Romero de Avila and Strauch, 
2007, Gupta et al., 2005). Based on the analysis of previous results and the 
developments of econometric theory (Arellano and Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 
1998, and Woolridge, 2002) we propose a dynamic model estimated by GMM methods 
that has not previously been applied to this particular problem. From the estimated 
dynamic coefficients, we determine long-term relations using the assumption assuming 
that the economy is in its steady state.  
 
In addition, we want to propose a broader framework that explains more accurately the 
relationship between the composition of the public budget and economic growth. The 
results of many empirical and theoretical studies suggest that the public budget has an 
impact on economic growth, not only through an effect on productivity, but also by 
altering the conditions in the production factor markets, labour and productivity.  
 
Unlike previous studies, we further analyse the mechanisms through which public 
budget composition alter long-term growth. Therefore, we also assess the relevance of 
the fiscal variables for labour productivity and total factor productivity. Such an 
approach allows us to discriminate between the impact on growth via productivity, and 
the effects of the alterations induced in the labour and private capital markets by 
distortionary taxation and public expenditure policies.  
 
The analysis yields interesting results about the channels through which the composition 
of the public budget affects economic growth. Of particular interest is the conclusion 
regarding the distortions induced by public investment in the capital markets, the so-
called crowding-in effect, which served to maintain significant levels of public 
investment. Moreover, public consumption is detrimental to growth because it reduces 
the incentives for private investment, while public employment retards productivity 
growth. On the revenue-side, contributions to social security seem to be an obstacle for 




We also associate a significant dependence of productivity on public expenditure 
towards education as well as the role of social security and health issues in growth and 
in the labour market. In addition we present results for the 12 countries that have 
recently joined the European Union. In general, estimations suggest that public 
expenditure seems to be less productive in these economies than in the older 15 EU 
members.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two addresses the 
theoretical underpinnings. Section three discusses the existing and our proposed 
empirical specifications. Section four presents the empirical analysis. Finally, section 
five contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings 
     
We will extend the simplest model of endogenous growth to assess several forms under 
which public taxation and expenditure could affect economic growth. Our purpose is to 
create heterogeneous types of public expenditure and taxation that affect economic 
growth through several channels that may be identified later in a growth regression. 
 
Assuming an economy in which there are four types of public expenditure and three 
types of taxation in an extended version of the AK model. The expenditure categories 
are represented by a public input in the production function (G1), a capital-enhancing 
type of public expenditure, (G2), a labour-enhancing type of public expenditure (G3), 
and a publicly provided consumption good (G4). Taxation is distributed among taxes on 
consumption ( cτ ), taxes on corporate profits ( πτ ) and taxes on labour income ( lτ ).  
 
Public expenditure modelled as a separate input in the production function has been 
used very often in economic theory since the proposals by Aschauer (1989) and Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992).2 We will assume a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant 
returns to scale over all inputs. Many public infrastructures could be included in this 
type of public expenditure. In this framework, considering public expenditure as a 
                                                 
2 Tanzi and Zee (1997) include a useful literature review on the fiscal policy determinants of long-run 
growth with the main channels under which taxes and public expenditure policies have been considered to 
affect production growth.  
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separate input in the production function is equivalent to incorporate it as a part of the 
technological constraint that determines total factor productivity: 
 
1,t t t tY AK L G
α γ δ=      (1) 
 
where Kt and Lt are private capital and labour supply respectively. Some authors have 
also proposed more complete frameworks introducing the effects of congestion and 
network externalities3, but for the sake of simplicity we will follow the original proposal 
by Aschauer (1989).4 
 
The capital-enhancing type of public expenditure (G2) responds to the cost-function 
approach of public expenditure proposed by several authors.5 The inclusion of public 
investment as a separate argument in the production function, as in G1, may violate the 
standard marginal productivity theory. Demetriades and Mamuneas (2004) study the 
reaction of output to a type of public expenditure that affects the cost function of the 
private sector.6 In our case, we will make use of the simplest way of affecting the price 
of public capital, by considering G2 to be a subsidy to the purchase of private capital, as 
proposed by Devarajan et al. (1998). Public investment in transport, for example, may 
influence the price of private capital goods with high transportation costs.  Being s a 
parameter lying in the interval (0,1) representing the non-subsidized share of private 
capital, the subsidised private capital paid through the capital-enhancing type of public 
expenditure will be7 
 
                                                 
3 For example, Fernald (1999) introduces transport services as a third input in the production function 
depending on the level of public investment and the rate of utilisation.  
4 Alternatively, we could model G1 as a determinant of the technology term, A. The analysis would be 
identical with the additional advantage of making a negative impact of the underlying public expenditure 
type of multifactor productivity growth more intuitive. Instead, we choose to model G1 as a separate input 
with the purpose of providing continuity to the literature initiated by Aschauer (1989). 
5 Romp and de Haan (2007) include a survey of the literature in which they highlight the main advantages 
of modelling public capital by including it in a cost-function in contrast to other alternatives, like the 
production function. 
6 The introduction of this type of public expenditure usually responds to rigidities in the capital markets: 
Demetriadis and Mamuneas  (2004) consider adjustment costs; Moreno et al. (2003) assume short term 
rigidities; and Devarajan et al. (1998) instead introduce it as a response to the existence of a positive 
externality attached to the subsidised capital. 
7 Our model assumes that public expenditure on G2 provides an incentive to private investment, although 
it could also have the opposite effect. Alesina et al. (2002), for example, present evidence of the negative 




2, (1 )t t tG s K= − .     (2) 
 
G3 is the labour-enhancing type of expenditure and is modelled following Agenor 
(2007). It represents those types of public expenditure that may induce the entry of more 
labour force on the market, or increase human capital, such as public expenditure on 
education or social programmes. We assume a labour supply that depends on the level 
of public expenditure on G3, the level of population and the real wage:  
 
3,t t t tL w G N
µ ν η= %      (3) 
 
where Nt represents population and w%  is the equilibrium real wage of labour supply, net 
of income taxes. The parameters µ  and η  are assumed to lie in the interval (0,1), but 
we have to also accept the possibility of negative values ofν , since public policies that 
create disincentives to the entry of additional labour supply on the labour market can 
exist. Those policies could be unemployment subsidies or wage pressures induced by 
the public salaries.8  
 
Finally we consider a type of public expenditure that is directly consumed by the 
households, entering therefore in their utility function (G4). We assume a Cobb-Douglas 
type utility function for the representative infinitively lived agent, as in Turnovsky 










= ∑ . (4) 
 
On the other side of the public budget, we will consider three types of taxation: taxes on 
consumption, taxes on corporate profits, and taxes on labour income; all three under the 
form of a constant tax rate represented respectively by the parameters cτ , πτ  and lτ .  
                                                 
8 Dhont and Heylen (2007) present theoretical and empirical evidence of the negative impact of subsidies, 
productive government expenditures and income taxes on labour supply in Europe in contrast to the US. 
9 Ganelly and Tervala (2007) also include a type of public expenditure in the household’s utility function 
together with productive public investment entering in the production function, in an open economy 
framework. In addition, they are able to estimate the impact of the distribution of public expenditure also 




We will not consider taxation on capital income since its share in public revenues is 
insignificant in the set of countries in which we focus our analysis, and since Chamley 
(1989) there is a relative consensus in the literature about its perverse effects.10  
 
The representative household is the owner of the capital and of the firms and provide 
labour supply. She get revenues from all those three activities, since in our economy 
with a publicly provided input, firms obtain positive profits. She has to choose the share 
of their income that they want to consume or to invest in additional capital for the next 
period, and in addition they have to pay taxes on labour income, on corporate profits 
and on consumption. If we assume a linear tax rate in every case, the households would 
face the following budget constraint: 
 
 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )c t t t l t t t t tC s K w L r Kπτ τ τ π+ ++ + = − + − +  (5) 
 
where cτ , lτ  and πτ  are the previously defined tax rates on consumption, labour income 
and corporate profits respectively, assuming  total depreciation of the physical capital, 
K. tπ represents corporate profits and r is the equilibrium price of private capital paid by 
firms to its owners. The representative agent takes the decisions of the government 
about taxes and public expenditure as exogenous. In every period, she decides on how 
to distribute her income between private capital and current consumption. Wages and 
cost of capital are determined by the market. She consumes to maximise her utility 
function (4) subject to the budget constraint (5) and her consumption path would be 






[ {(1 ) (1 ) } ]tt tl
t t t t
GC Y
C G s K
θ
π
βα τ δ τ γ α −
− −
= − + − + . (6) 
 
Therefore, the dependency of the process of capital accumulation on corporate profits 
and labour income taxes, as well as the consumption public good G4 it is revealed. In 
this environment, a constant tax rate on consumption does not represent an obstacle for 
investment or growth. 
                                                 
10 This result has been questioned by other studies, for example, by Correia (1996) and Huffman (2001).  
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From equations (1) to (6) we can determine the effect of a permanent increase on any of 
the fiscal variables. After log linearising and plugging in the expressions for labour and 
capital in equation (1) we can write the following derivatives, for each of the four types 
















































where (1 )(1 )α µ αµΦ = − + −  and the fiscal variables in small letters denote growth 
rates obtained from log-linearisation.11  
 
The derivative of the growth rate with respect to g4,t-1 has an identical absolute value as 








 but with the opposite sign. That means that a permanent increase in 
public consumption only produces a short-term effect in the economic growth rate 
which will be corrected in the period after. In contrast, the effects of a change in the 
growth rates of the capital enhancing public expenditure, G2, the labour enhancing 
public expenditure, G3, and the public production factor, G1, are permanent and depend 
on the elasticities of substitution of the respective factors.  
 
Identically to public consumption, a permanent change in the tax rate of consumption 
taxes would not induce changes in the long-term growth rate, since consumers would 
                                                 
11 For example, ( / ) /t t ty dY dt Y= . 
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not change their pattern of investment and consumption, even though there would be 
short-term fluctuations. Indeed, this is explained because the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution between present and future consumption remains unchanged if the 
representative consumer takes the change in the tax rate as permanent.  
 
However, changes on the other two direct taxes, labour income tax and corporate 
income tax, have implications for the growth rate of production since they alter the 
decisions of the agent on consumption and investment. In the case of labour income tax, 
it also influences the labour supply. The derivatives of the growth rate of production 




, , , ,
(1 )  +
(1 ) ' (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
t
l t t l t l t
y
π
α µ γ µγ
τ τ δ τ γ α τ
∂ +
=






(1 ) ' (1 ) (1 )
t




τ τ δ τ γ α
∂ +
=
∂ − Φ − + − +
. (12) 
 
Both types of direct taxes have a negative impact on economic growth, as can be seen 
from (11) and (12). Labour taxation produces a – smaller – disincentive on private 
investment because of the increases in labour costs which are induced by the tax 
(represented by the first term inside the brackets in (11)). But its main impact on growth 
would be produced by the reduction in the labour supply represented by the second term 
of equation (11), which is a consequence of the smaller wages, net of taxes, perceived 
by the workers. Corporate profits taxation acts through a reduction on private 
investment because of the disincentive to invest introduced by the tax. 
 
We have included several types of public expenditure and taxes, not only to see how the 
magnitude of the impact on economic growth differs according to the channel through 
which they act, but also to assess how they may be identified in growth regressions. We 
have already seen that although G4 provokes an immediate impact on economic growth, 
the long-term effect is insignificant. G1, G2 and G3 induce permanent effects on growth, 
                                                 
12 Where we have, for instance, , ,(1 ) ' (1 ) /l t l td dtτ τ− = − . 
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but through different channels. If we consider the effects on labour productivity instead 
of on production growth (defined as production per worker), the effects of G1, G2 and 
G4 would remain practically unaltered vis-à-vis equations (7), (8) and (10) However, 
instead of equation (9), G3 will have an opposite impact on labour productivity in 

















This is an expected result, as a determined type of public expenditure boosts (or 
diminishes) production growth by increasing (decreasing) labour supply. However, we 
should expect an opposite effect on labour productivity because of the decreasing 
returns to scale to a single factor of the Cobb-Douglas production function.  
 
Finally, if we consider Total Factor Productivity (TFP), defined as the Solow residual, 
G2, G3 and G4 would have no effect on multifactor productivity while G1 still has an 










Identically to the situation described for public expenditure, taxation on labour income 
will have an impact on labour productivity growth (lab) which is significantly different 
from the one that it produces on production growth, because of the decreasing returns to 
scale in a single factor of the production function: 
 
 
, , , ,
+ ( 1)
(1 ) ' (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
t
l t t l t l t
lab
π
α γ µ γ
τ τ δ τ γ α µ τ
∂
= −
∂ − Φ − + − + + − Φ
. (14) 
 
Indeed, the effect of the tax on labour productivity through the alterations of labour 
supply represented by the second term inside the brackets in (12), has an opposite sign 
since a reduction in labour supply would induce a smaller production growth, but a 




The following table summarizes the main relationships of the seven fiscal variables 




3. Empirical specifications 
 
3.1. Existing literature 
 
Barro (1991) is the first main reference to use cross-sectional data to estimate the effect 
of fiscal variables on economic growth. He uses a sample of 98 countries and a 
significant variety of variables to estimate their long-term impact on economic growth. 
The estimated static equation employs the growth rate of GDP for a long period, as the 
dependent variable (of a minimum of fifteen years). Regarding fiscal variables, the 
study finds a negative significant correlation of public consumption with growth and no 
significant effect for public investment.  
 
Other studies refined the methodology by including the time dimension of the panel 
(Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) and also the first critics about the accuracy of the results 
obtained. Levine and Renelt (1991) provide a review of cross-country growth 
regressions and enumerate the significant discrepancy that exists in the results, while 
Levin and Renelt (1992) show that the results obtained with the growth regressions are 
very sensitive to small variations in the conditioning information set.    
 
A first attempt to answer the critics was made by Devarajaan et al. (1996), who make 
use of economic theory and claim that the effect on growth induced by some kind of 
public expenditure may depend on the initial level of expenditure. That is probably one 
of the reasons why subsequent work did not include developed and developing 
countries in the same panel, which had been quite a common practice in previous 
studies. Indeed, the use of a more homogeneous panel country sample seems to be a 
more adequate approach. 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) pointed out and explained the inconsistencies in the results of 
previous studies. They claimed that the estimated coefficients attached to the fiscal 
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variables have to be interpreted by using some financing assumption. In other words, 
the elements of the public budget that are not included in the regression, represent the 
implicit financing assumptions of the effects of the included variables.13 To avoid 
perfect multicollinearity, at least one of the components of the public budget must be 
omitted. If we estimate a coefficient attached to the included components of the budget, 
this estimated coefficient assumes that the increase or decrease in the respective fiscal 
variable is financed by an equivalent alteration in the omitted variables 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) also address two traditional critics to growth regressions: the 
possible endogeneity of the fiscal variables and the consequences of the 5-year 
averaging that was usually applied to growth series in order to control for the business 
cycle effects. They compare the results from the fixed-effects linear model estimated by 
OLS, with those from an instrumental variable estimation to conclude that the previous 
results were not produced by the endogeneity of the variables. Moreover, they also find 
that the results are sensitive to the 5-year averaging of GDP growth. On the other hand, 
Odedokun (2001) uses the 5-year moving average, arguing that it is an optimal method 
to cater for the endogeneity of fiscal variables.14 Additionally, and also using 5-year 
averages, Folster and Henrekson (2001) report significant negative growth effects for 
total government spending in an OECD country sample.15  
 
Bleaney et al. (2001) confirm the volatility of the results when the variables are 
expressed as a 5-year moving average. By comparing the estimation of their baseline 
model with its dynamic counterpart, they conclude that the sensitivity of the 
estimations, when variables are expressed as 5-year moving averages, is due to the fact 
that the effects of fiscal variables on growth show up in the long-term. They also 
interpret the differences in the coefficients with the models estimated with annual data 
                                                 
13 This idea was already described by Miller and Russek (1997) and applied to two samples of 16 
developed and 23 developing countries although they do not test to what extent the ignorance of the 
budget constraint of the government may be a source of bias, which is the main focus in Kneller et al. 
(1999). 
14 He divides his sample of developing countries into four groups and finds a negative effect from public 
expenditure on growth (except for grants), a negative effect from current expenditure and, in the case of 
mineral exporting and high-income countries also a negative effect from capital expenditure. The effects 
of transport and health are quite variable, while education would promote growth in all groups. The 
effects of external grants are also unclear.  
15 Agell et al. (2006) question these results notably on the basis of endogeneity issues.  
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as a result of the existence of endogeneity of fiscal variables that would bias the 
estimation of the coefficients with annual data.  
 
Bassanini and Scarpeta (2001) rely on the Pooled Mean Group Estimator, developed by 
Pesaran et al. (1999), which constrains the long-term relationship of the explanatory 
variables with economic growth to be identical across countries while allowing the 
possibility for heterogeneous short-term effects, which are estimated separately. Their 
argument is that the divergence of previous results could be provoked by the existence 
of heterogeneity among countries in the short-term. They estimate a positive impact of 
public expenditure on growth, but also a stronger negative impact of taxation that imply 
a negative total effect of increasing the size of the budget. An increase in public 
investment would enhance growth regardless of the increase in taxation necessary to 
finance such investment effort.  
 
Romero de Avila and Strauch (2007) also estimate short-term and long-term effects of 
the fiscal variables on growth in the same equation, but using a different approach, 
which is based on Jones (1995). The method relies on the specification of an equation 
based on an AK model with non-stationary fiscal variables (in levels) to discriminate 
the long-term effect on growth from the short term effect attached.16    
 
Finally, Gupta et al. (2005) consider the possibility of an autoregressive term to account 
for the dynamic behaviour of growth, rather than using data-averaging. They are able to 
show that for a panel of developing countries, the importance of discriminating 
government deficit on the basis of the source of the loans. In other words, whether the 
deficit is financed by issuing public debt or from an international loan, since the issue of 
domestic debt may induce additional distortion in the factor markets. Table 2 






                                                 
16 Tomljanovich (2004) uses a similar analysis for the US States.  
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3.2. Dynamic impact of public finances on long-term growth  
 
Traditionally, the relationship of economic growth to fiscal variables has been estimated 
under the form of a static model in which the use of variables expressed in large 
frequency periods – usually five years – accounts for the long-term relationship.17 
However, and as discussed above, some studies revealed the volatility of the results due 
to the averaging process of the variables.18 Two main weaknesses have been identified 
as the source of the lack of robustness of the results: the endogeneity of the fiscal 
variables used to explain economic growth and the definition of the long-term 
relationship under the data averaging.  
 
The endogeneity issue has been accounted for in several studies with the use of IV 
techniques.19 The use of yearly data to estimate long-term relationships implies setting 
up a new framework yielding more reliable estimates. As already mentioned, several 
authors have proposed alternative models. Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) propose the 
use of the Pooled Mean Group Estimator to discriminate short-term idiosyncratic effects 
from long-term common effects. Romero de Avila and Strauch (2007) also consider the 
discrimination of long-term effects, but rely on the non-stationary behaviour of the 
fiscal variables in levels and their cointegrating relationship with growth. Gupta et al. 
(2005) instead propose the estimation of an AR(1) model with the fiscal variables 
expressed in the usual static form, as percentages of GDP.  
 
Our view is that the relationship of fiscal variables to growth is dynamic by nature, and 
the lack of precision of previous estimates could be related to the omission of these 
dynamics. In addition to the autoregressive behaviour of economic growth, fiscal 
variables may induce an impact on growth distributed across several periods. That may 
be particularly relevant for several categories of public expenditure, which might induce 
a certain impact in the economy in the period in which they are actually realised, and a 
different impact in subsequent periods.  
 
                                                 
17 While some studies use 5-year averaging in all variables (Kneller et al. 1999, and Bleaney et al 2001), 
others regress five-year forward looking moving average of GDP growth (t+1,t+5) on yearly expressed 
fiscal variables (at time t) to refrain from endogeneity  (Devarajan et al., 1996, and Odedokun, 2001).  
18 See Levine and Renelt (1992), Kneller et al. (1999). 
19 See Bleaney et al. (2001) and Gupta et al. (2005). 
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This motivates our proposal to model the growth equation as an Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) model, including lags of dependent and fiscal variables: 
 
 , , , , ,1 0
p q
i t i t j i t j s i t s i i t i tj s
y y fiscal otherµ ν λ δ ρ ε− −= == + + Σ + Σ + +  (15) 
 
where the index i (i=1,…,N) denotes the country, the index t (t=1,…,T) indicates the 
period. iµ  and tν are the unit specific and the time specific effect respectively. The unit 
specific effect accounts for the time-invariant idiosyncratic characteristic of every 
country, such as its initial level of GDP or human capital, natural resources, etc.20 
 
In (15) y indicates the logarithmic growth rate of per capita output, fiscal is a set of 
fiscal variables and other is a set of non-fiscal variables to be included in the growth 
regression.  
 
We propose to estimate equation (15) using the GMM estimator developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). The GMM estimate controls for endogeneity by using the lagged 
values of the levels of the endogenous and of the predetermined variables as 
instruments. It is necessary to test for the validity of the instruments as well as for the 
presence of serial correlation in the residual once the specification has been estimated.21 
 
Estimates have been obtained using the one step procedure, since the two step 
procedure has been found to yield biased downward standard errors for small samples. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) also develop a one step robust procedure for the cases in 
which heteroskedasticity exists, but we think that there is no need to use the robust 
estimator in this study due to the characteristics of the data. The Sargan test of over 
identifying restrictions over-rejects in the presence of heteroskedasticity with the one 
step procedure. In our case this would not be a drawback since the data are not 
suspected of heteroskedasticity and in any case the Sargan test cannot reject the null 
                                                 
20 The time-specific effect has been finally removed from our estimated equation. Preliminary results 
including time-dummies (available upon request) reveal that there are no significant time effects in our 
sample period.  
21 Although Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) improve the efficiency of the 
"difference GMM" estimator by introducing additional assumptions of no correlation between the fixed-
effects and the first differences of the instrumenting variables, a hypothesis which we do not assume. 
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hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. But the estimated coefficients 
from equation (15) are still difficult to interpret. We cannot asses with certainty whether 
one variable has a relevant impact on growth, particularly if we estimate coefficients 
with opposite signs for several lags of the same fiscal variable. For that reason, we want 
to derive a unique coefficient that includes all the lags of every explanatory variable as 
well as the autoregressive terms.  
 
We will assume an economy in its steady state in which all variables grow at a constant 
rate in order to get a unique long-run coefficient for each fiscal variable. If we impose 



















Standard errors for the coefficients obtained with this procedure may be easily 
computed applying a delta method which consists of expanding a function of a variable 
about its mean with a one-step Taylor approximation and then taking the variance. A 
general discussion of this method can be found in Wooldridge (2002) and Papke and 
Wooldridge (2004).  
 




Our dataset covers the period 1971-2006 for 15 EU Member States, although we also 
use a smaller time sample for the 12 new Member States that have joined the EU after 
2003.22 The fiscal variables refer to the consolidated general government and are 
expressed as ratios of GDP.  
 
                                                 
22 The EU15 countries are: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom. The new member states 
are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Romania and Bulgaria 
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Regarding public expenditure, we focus our analysis on the economic classification 
while we also use a smaller time sample for the main functional categories of public 
expenditure. Our analysis excludes those variables that have a residual importance on 
the public budget or whose interpretation is not clear. As for the functional categories of 
public expenditure, we focus our attention on four out of the ten categories (according 
to the COFOG classification), that account for broadly two thirds of the total budget. 
 
In addition we have included four control variables: labour force growth, private 
investment, terms of trade and population growth. The inclusion of the production 
factors related to capital increase (proxied by private investment) and labour force 
growth follow from the theoretical model presented before and are in line with the 
related literature. Population growth may determine the growth of the dependent 
variables as long as it is expressed in per capita terms. Several studies have suggested 
the relevance of terms of trade or the presence of a similar variable representing the 
economic openness of a country.23  
 
Our data source is the European Commission Ameco database and in the Data 
Appendix we illustrate each fiscal variable in terms of GDP ratios at the beginning and 
at the end of the samples and provide correlations between the main variables. Table 3 
reports the descriptive statistics for the full panel sample, while Figure 1 presents some 
trends, regarding country groups, for GDP and selected fiscal variables. We can see 
how expenditure and taxation in the group of countries that have grown faster have 
followed a different pattern of behaviour with respect to the group of countries with 
smaller growth. In the early nineties, the Group A countries start to growth faster than 
the richer countries in Group B. This coincides in time with a change in the trends for 
public consumption and public investment, also growing faster in Group A from this 
point onwards. However, it also coincides with a relative increase of public revenues: 
social contributions and direct taxation. This analysis does not guarantee that the causal 
relation goes from the fiscal variables to production and not the other way around, but it 
suggests that it could be important to scrutinise the relationship more closely.  
 
[Table 3] 
                                                 






The unit specific term in our panel model takes into account the effect of time invariant 
variables, whose impact have been suggested by previous analysis, such as initial levels 
of GDP or human capital.24  
 
Based on preliminary estimations, we have not included time dummies in our model. 
These would show no statistical significance and would induce no relevant changes in 
the estimations, apart from slightly larger values for the standard errors in general.  
 
4.2. Initial results for growth specifications 
 
Table 4 reports the results for the EU15 data set for the period 1971-2006. A key point 
to make a correct interpretation of the estimated coefficients is the importance of the 
omitted variable on each regression, as described in Kneller et al. (1999). Therefore, in 
columns 1 to 4 in Table 4 we compute the impact of an increase of several categories of 
public expenditure on economic growth. The omitted variables represent the underlying 
assumption about how to finance the additional expenditure in the particular type of 
public spending item. In all cases, the omitted variables are the remainder of the public 
expenditures. That means that the interpretation of the coefficient associated with public 
consumption, for example, reflects the increase in growth that would induce an 
increase25 in public expenditure in consumption associated with an equivalent decrease 




In columns 5 and 6 we aim to seek the effect on growth of different kinds of taxes. The 
omitted variables are the remaining public revenues. Therefore, the estimated 
coefficients reflect the impact on economic growth induced by an increase of one 
                                                 
24 As proposed by Kneller et al. (1999), Bose et al. (2003) and Reed (2006) among others. 
25 That is, the increase in the logarithmic growth rate of per capita GDP induced by a one point increase in 
public expenditure, expressed as a percentage of GDP. The estimated coefficients are relative to those of 
the omitted variable. In this respect, the comparison of the several models on each table may be useful to 
yield conclusions about the variables driving changes on growth and productivity.  
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percentage point in the particular type of revenue, financed by an equivalent reduction 
in the remaining (omitted) sources of revenues. The interpretation of the other fiscal 
variables (deficit, total public expenditure) follow a similar argument and the estimated 
coefficients assume that the alterations of the variables would imply the fulfilment of 
the budgetary identity by modifying the elements of the budget items that are not 
present in the estimation.    
 
The coefficients shown in Table 4 are the long-term coefficients computed through 
equation (16) from the coefficients estimated in equation (15) using the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) GMM estimator. Column 1 reveals a clear negative relationship of public 
consumption with economic growth. A slightly statistically significant and negative 
coefficient has also been estimated for social transfers, while for the other determinants 
of current public expenditure, wages and subsidies, we cannot find a coefficient 
significantly different from zero.  
 
Public investment enhances economic growth in the long-term, as revealed by the 
estimated coefficient of around 0.65 (see column 4). That means that an increase in 
public investment of a percentage point of GDP, financed by an equivalent decrease in 
current public expenditure (omitted variables), would induce an increase in the growth 
rate of per capita GDP of around 0.65 percentage points.  
 
The overall effect of public revenues is estimated to be negative as shown by the 
coefficients attached to that variable in columns 1 to 4. The estimated coefficient is 
relative to the omitted variables of public expenditure Therefore it is not surprising that 
the coefficient estimated in column 4 is larger in absolute value since the omitted 
variables include all public expenditure except public investment.  
 
In columns 5 and 6 we disaggregate the implications of public taxation in economic 
growth. The estimated coefficients are not extremely significant, which could be an 
indicator that governments properly accommodated tax distribution. Nevertheless, the 
significantly negative coefficient attached to social contributions could reveal that a 
slight decrease in this revenue item reallocated to higher indirect taxation could have 
helped to promote economic growth in our sample (although the estimated coefficient 




The negative coefficient attached to total public expenditure in columns 5 and 6 is not a 
surprise, taking into account the results described in columns 1 to 4. In the light of the 
results, there could have been a situation of overspending in our panel sample that has 
retarded economic growth.  
 
With regards to the control variables, their respective estimated coefficients are in line 
with previous studies. The budget deficit always has a positive effect on long-term 
growth, even if it is not always statistically significant. For instance, Kneller et al. 
(1999), also find a positive coefficient attached to the budget deficit for a panel of 
OECD countries.  
 
The positive coefficient attached to private investment follows from standard economic 
theory, in which an increase in the amount of production factors will naturally induce an 
increase in production. The same reasoning can be applied to the variable labour force, 
although a negative coefficient has been estimated by previous studies with data from 
developing countries (Odedokun, 2001, Bose et al., 2003), this may be a consequence of 
the definition of the dependent variable in per capita terms.  
 
The coefficient attached to the terms of trade is usually positive for developing 
countries since trade is assumed to be growth-enhancing. However in our sample of 
European countries, international trade is largely developed and the estimated negative 
coefficient may be provoked by the perverse impact of the faster capital accumulation 
on trade importance as mentioned by Acemoglu and Ventura (2001).26   
 
Some of our results are in line with previous studies. Of course, we also expect different 
results from studies including diverse panel samples, particularly when we compare 
developed and developing countries. For example, Devarajan et al. (1996) find a 
negative coefficient associated to public capital expenditure in their panel of 43 
developing countries, for the period 1970-1990, revealing a possible situation of 
overspending in public capital during this period. Odedokun (2001) also finds a 
negative coefficient attached to public capital expenditure on his sub-sample of 
                                                 
26 Miller and Russek (1997) estimate a positive coefficient associated to their variable openness while 
Gupta et al. (2005) find a negative coefficient attached to the terms of trade.  
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developed countries. On the other hand, Romero de Avila and Strauch (2007) and 
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), both using data very similar to ours, estimate a positive 
coefficient for EU and OECD countries. Additionally, Gupta et al. (2005) also find a 
positive coefficient for public capital expenditure in their sample of 39 low-income 
economies.  
 
Odedokun (2001) estimates a positive coefficient attached to the public expenditure in 
wages while Gupta et al (2005) estimate a negative coefficient attached to wages and 
salaries. However our study shows no significant coefficients attached to this variable.  
 
Our negative coefficient attached to social transfers can be related to the results by 
Kneller et al. (1999), who estimate a negative coefficient associated to their variable 
‘non-productive expenditures’, whose main component is social security and welfare 
policies. For this budgetary item, our results are also in line with the ones reported by 
Romero de Avila and Strauch (2007). However, Cashin (1994) estimates a positive 
coefficient associated to this variable for a panel of 23 developed countries, using fixed 
and random effect estimation. 
 
Regarding the composition of public revenues, several studies find a negative impact of 
general taxation on growth: Bose et al. (2003) for developing countries, Reed (2006), 
and Basanini and Scarpetta (2001) for developed economies. 
 
Kneller et al. (1999) estimate a negative effect of ‘distortionary taxation’, which 
included direct taxes and social security contributions, for OECD countries. They find 
no significant effect for non-distortionary (indirect) taxation. Their results are in line 
with our estimations while the positive coefficient estimated for direct taxation by 
Romero de Avila and Strauch (2007) does not coincide with our results. 
 
4.3. Time consistency of the results  
 
Some studies suggest the possibility that there has not been a constant relationship 
between fiscal variables and growth, especially because of the change on the impact of 
public investment in growth and in productivity (Caselli et al., 2000 and Afonso and St. 
Aubyn, 2007). The two aforementioned studies are able to identify a break in the return 
 
 26
to private and public investment in a set of European countries at the beginning of the 
nineties. Therefore, we want to assess the evolution of the impact of our fiscal variables 
in economic growth by splitting our sample into two, with the break point in 1990. 






With regards to public expenditure, the behaviour of public consumption, social 
transfers, subsidies, and total public expenditure seems reasonably steady over time. On 
the contrary, compensation of employees and especially public investment has changed 
their impact on growth towards a less beneficial situation. In the second half of the 
sample a situation of overspending appears to exist in public wages, which could be 
growth retarding. Public investment has passed from being growth enhancing in the first 
sub-period of the sample to have a statistically null effect in the second sub-period (see 
column 4).  
 
There are also some changes in the revenue side. The increase in revenues from direct 
taxation and social contributions in the first two decades of the time sample may have 
been excessive, making indirect taxation more desirable to promote growth.    
 
4.4. Using 5-year growth averages 
 
As mentioned before we have used a new approach in our paper. The standard approach 
of static modelling previously used to estimate the effects of fiscal variables in 
economic growth, under the argument that the omission of the dynamic in the 
relationships between the variables, may lead to biased estimates. Therefore, it is 
interesting to assess to what extent our methodology produces different results, under a 
static specification and using a five-year forward-looking moving average of per capita 
GDP growth as dependent variable, as done, for example, by Devarajan et al. (1996) or 




Table 7 presents the results, and we can observe relevant differences in some 
coefficients. In particular the smaller absolute value for public consumption, the level of 
significance of public wages, public subsidies and public investment, and the sign 
attached to indirect taxation. In terms of the control variables we can also see some 




Our argument is that the averaging process is not able to capture the dynamics that we 
can show to exist in the impact of the fiscal variables on growth. This causes the 
estimated coefficients under the traditional static models to present a significant bias.  
 
4.5. Labour and total factor productivity 
 
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of estimating equation (15) using respectively labour 
productivity and multifactor productivity as dependent variables. The objective is to be 
able to identify which types of public expenditures and revenues enhance economic 
growth by boosting labour supply, private capital or factor productivity. Our 
methodology also allows to identify fiscal variables that may have an impact on 
economic growth in the short-term, but have no long-term effect, as it happened to G4 
(publicly provided consumption good) or cτ  (consumption tax) in our theoretical model.  
 
In Table 1 we summarised the description of the link that we established between the 
type of public expenditure and the result of estimations in Tables 4, 8 and 9. However, 
we have to consider the possibility that some fiscal variables may simultaneously affect 
economic growth through several channels.27 Our tables report the long-term 
coefficients computed according to equation (16). Therefore, they do not reflect the 
short-term dynamics that could appear in the direct estimations of equation (15) and that 
could serve to identify which fiscal variables could behave like G4 and cτ .
28  
                                                 
27 For the sake of simplicity our theoretical framework only includes one channel of impact for every type 
of public expenditure and taxation. Public expenditure on wages, for example, could simultaneously 
behave as the productivity-enhancing and the capital-enhancing types of public expenditure. Social 
contributions may have a short-term effect similar to the one described in the case of consumption taxes 
in addition to the long-term effect attached to the profit-tax described in our theoretical model. 






The comparison of tables 4 and 8 should allow us to identify which categories of public 
expenditures and taxation have an impact on production through alterations in the 
labour market, similar to the one described for G3 and lτ  in section 2. Those would be 
the fiscal variables for which the estimated coefficients are significantly different in 
both tables. We observe no big differences between both estimations. We are only able 
to identify some changes in the estimates for social transfers, public investment and 
slightly in social contributions. 
 
The capital-enhancing type of public expenditure (G2) and revenues of the type of the 
corporate profits taxation ( πτ ), in contrast to G3 and lτ , should appear with similar 
coefficients in Tables 4 and 8, since their effect on GDP and labour productivity is 
almost identical. All of them (G2, πτ , G3 and lτ ) have no effect on TFP. 
 
Table 9 presents the estimations using Total Factor Productivity growth as dependent 
variable and any variable showing a significant coefficient behaves as the productivity-
enhancing type of public expenditure (G1) described in section 2. Those types of public 
expenditure should, in addition, yield a similar result when used as regressors in 
estimating GDP or labour productivity growth. If this is not the case, the underlying 
variable may impact economic growth through another channel in addition to the effect 




However, this seems to be the case for public consumption, public wages and public 
investment. The absolute estimated coefficient attached to public consumption is clearly 
smaller than the one estimated in Tables 4 and 8. Public wages appear with a negative 
coefficient only in Table 9. According to our model, this would mean that both 
variables should have a simultaneous impact on growth, through multifactor 
productivity. The sign of the capital-enhancing effect would be positive in the case of 




The effect of public investment should also be examined carefully. It seems as if the 
level of investment is too high and this negatively affects multifactor productivity. But 
this negative impact would be counterbalanced by both a higher propensity to invest 
(the so-called crowding-in effect) and an increase in the labour supply induced by 
public investment.  
 
With regard to the tax variables, we do not find many surprises in the results. As 
expected, taxes have no relevant effect on multifactor productivity. But it also seems 
that neither do they have a visible impact on labour supply according to the estimates 
for labour productivity growth, even for labour tax. The main effect would be caused by 
alterations in the pattern of consumption and private investment. Table 10 summarises 
the link of the findings on the estimations in this sub-section with the theoretical 
framework developed in section 2. This table has been constructed from the comparison 
of Table 1 with the results shown in Tables 4, 8 and 9. The variables used in our 
estimations are attached to one or more theoretical categories of public expenditure or 





4.6. EU new Member States 
 
Table 11 presents the results of the estimates for the sub-sample of 12 EU new Member 
States. Since the data availability for this set of countries is less extensive we can only 




The level of expenditure-to-GDP ratios is similar to the sample of EU15, but it seems as 
if public expenditure has been slightly less growth friendly in this set of 12 countries for 
the period considered. A remarkable difference is the effect of indirect taxation, while in 
the EU15 sample the results seem to point to a reallocation of tax revenues towards 
indirect taxation, in the EU12 sample the coefficient accompanying indirect taxation is 
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negative and statistically significant. The negative effect of social contributions is also 
quite noticeable. The main drawback of this table is the relative small set of 
observations used due to the lack of data for some of those countries at the beginning of 
the sample period.  
 
4.7. Functional spending 
 
Table 12 shows the results of regressing growth on the main four functional categories 
of public expenditures: economic affairs, health, education and social protection.29 The 




The results reveal that there is a certain level of overspending in health and eventually 
in social protection, while public expenditure in education seems to be extremely 
productive in the long-run.  
 
These results do not contradict previous findings for other sets of countries. For 
example Odedokun (2001) estimates a positive coefficient attached to education in the 
whole sample and a negative coefficient attached to health, but only in the sample of 
developed countries. Bose (2003) also finds a positive coefficient attached to education 
while for OECD countries Bleaney et al. (2001) estimate a positive coefficient attached 
to the variable “productive expenditures” that includes education, health, transport and 
communications and general public services among others. While Kneller et al. (1999) 
find an insignificant coefficient attached to the variable “non-productive expenditure”, 
we now estimate a negative coefficient for social protection, and this was also the case 
for social transfers in the economic classification. Interestingly, we find a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for economic affairs. These two spending functions, 
together with recreation, are included in the variables “unproductive expenditure” in 
Kneller at al. (1999).  
                                                 
29 The other functional categories of public expenditure according to the COFOG classification are: 
General Public Services, Defence, Public Order and Safety, Environment Protection, Housing and 
Community amenities and Recreation, Culture and Religion. We have omitted them from the analysis in 
order to focus the attention to the categories yielding more interesting results. Our four categories 






The link between the composition of the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget 
and economic growth has been the focus of recent developments in endogenous growth 
theory. Several studies have proposed different channels through which public 
expenditure and taxation could affect economic growth and productivity. In particular, 
fiscal policy has been assumed to be able to affect production by altering the pattern of 
consumption and investment of the economy by introducing incentives and 
disincentives in the utility and productivity of the individuals that affect the equilibrium 
in the labour market, and, in the case of public expenditure, also as a separate input that 
comes in the production function. We want to introduce this debate also into the 
empirical literature by comparing the results of estimating three alternative dependent 
variables in a growth regression.   
 
On the empirical side, the latest efforts have tried to find a commonly accepted 
framework to model the impact of the distribution of the public budget on economic 
growth, as a response to several drawbacks found in the traditional methods used in the 
nineties. Panel data models seem to be a generally accepted framework to estimate the 
impact of fiscal policies on economic growth as long as there is some degree of 
homogeneity among the units included in the sample.  We propose the estimation of a 
dynamic panel data model with lags of the explanatory variables (ARDL) from which 
we will be able to compute long-term relationships. This methodology allows us to deal 
with the main critics done to previous studies: the presence of endogeneity, the dynamic 
behaviour of the relations and the omitted variable issue.  
 
Using data for the 27 countries in the EU for the period 1971-2006, we are able to 
identify the negative impact of public consumption and social security contributions on 
economic growth, and the positive impact of public investment. Our regression results 
suggest that an overall situation of excessive expenditure may exist in the oldest 
members of the EU in contrast to a negative impact of social transfers, subsidies, public 
wages and direct taxation in the new members. On functional expenditure the study 
points to a negative impact of health and social protection expenditures on production 




Unlike previous studies, we try to better accommodate our results to the developments 
of economic theory by identifying the channels through which each budgetary category 
may impact on production growth. Our regressions for labour productivity and TFP, as 
alternative dependent variables, reveal that the main impact of fiscal variables comes 
through alterations in the pattern of investment of the economy. We are able to identify 
the existence of a crowding-in effect of public investment into private investment that 
provokes an overall positive effect of public investment on economic growth, despite its 
negative impact on multifactor productivity. Social expenditures and public investment 
seem to also affect the labour market while public consumption and public wages have 
a significant impact on multifactor productivity.  
 
This analysis can be improved in many ways: the impact of public expenditure on 
private investment and the labour market may be addressed in a more specific context. 
The definition of public expenditure may be extended to include other transfers from 
supranational levels of government. In particular our case could address the impact of 
the direct transfers from the European Commission to the private sector through 
agricultural and regional policies. Finally, the decomposition of public expenditure 
attending to the level of government could also yield interesting results, since the level 
of fiscal decentralisation and structures are still very heterogeneous in our set of 
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Data appendix  
 
Table A1 – Definition of variables and data sources 
 
GDP data 
MArpcGDP Five-year forward-looking moving-average of per capita GDP 
Moving average from data at current 
prices 
logpcGDP Log of real per capita GDP growth rate Growth rate from data at current prices 
logLAB Log of Labor productivity growth rate Growth rate from data at current prices 
TFP TFP growth rate Growth rate from data at current prices 
General government public spending 
PEtot Total expenditure; general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PEcons Final consumption expenditure of general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PEemp Compensation of employees; general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PEsoc Social benefits other than social transfers in kind; general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PEsub Subsidies; general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PEinv Gross fixed capital formation; general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
General government public spending, functional categories 
PEeco Public Expenditure on Economic Affairs and services. General government. cofog gf04 Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PEhlth Public expenditure on health. General government. cofog gf07 Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PEedu Public expenditure on Education.  General government. cofog gf09 Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PEss Social protection. General government. cofog gf10 Share on GDP from data at current prices 
General government public revenue 
PRtot Total revenue; general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PRdirtax Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes); general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PRsoc Social contributions received; general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
PRindtax Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes); general government Share on GDP from data at current prices 
Control variables 
PrivInv Private sector investment % GDP 
Labfrgr Total labour force growth rate (Labour force statistics) 
Growth rate constructed from data in 1000 
persons 
Tot Terms of trade goods and services (National accounts) 
Growth rate constructed from series 
2000=100 
Popgr Total population growth rate Growth rate from series of total population
 












Table A2 – Fiscal variables, beginning of the sample (% of GDP) 
 
 Public spending Public revenue 
 
 
Year Tot Cons Emp SocTr Int Sub Inv Tot Dirtax Indtax SocC 
Deficit
BEL 41.72 17.70 9.64 11.39 3.56 2.09 4.81 38.71 10.73 12.97 11.38 3.01 
DEU 39.58 16.33 9.04 12.62 0.97 1.44 4.55 39.73 11.07 12.21 12.34 -0.15 
GRC 24.56 11.01 8.17 8.76 0.88 1.17 2.82 24.56 3.44 11.90 7.82 0.00 
ESP 21.66 10.16 6.22 7.72 0.52 0.97 2.97 21.14 3.45 7.00 7.96 0.52 
FRA 36.53 17.28 10.60 14.12 0.94 1.89 3.70 37.11 6.30 14.24 13.89 -0.58 
IRL 34.66 15.03 10.15 8.14 3.43 4.08 3.97 30.87 8.52 16.95 2.39 3.79 
ITA 34.39 16.80 10.58 12.03 1.87 1.98 2.76 29.32 5.23 10.13 11.41 5.06 
LUX 28.29 11.99 6.11 12.74 0.91 1.11 3.55 30.23 10.13 8.29 8.18 -1.94 
NLD 44.28 20.68 12.69 12.83 2.86 0.94 5.17 42.71 13.42 9.73 14.26 1.57 
AUT 37.64 14.85 9.68 14.78 0.99 1.71 5.13 39.06 10.49 15.82 10.64 -1.42 
PRT 18.64 12.10 6.68 3.51 0.46 1.10 2.17 20.67 4.47 8.97 5.19 -2.03 
FIN 30.86 15.70 10.23 8.53 0.93 2.64 3.78 35.17 13.54 13.05 5.96 -4.31 
DNK 42.17 21.71 14.27 10.81 1.31 3.22 4.21 47.13 23.47 17.37 2.37 -4.96 
SWE 43.81 23.23 14.77 12.09 1.90 1.76 5.79 48.79 19.20 14.20 9.11 -4.98 




































CZE 1995 54.47 20.89 7.35 10.74 1.03 2.86 5.26 41.03 9.56 12.26 14.40 13.44 
EST 1993 35.11 22.62 8.46 10.44 0.19 0.92 4.57 44.99 12.64 12.84 11.77 -9.88 
CYP 1998 36.73 16.57 13.52 8.70 3.07 1.13 2.86 32.60 9.71 11.06 6.88 4.13 
LVA 1990 31.67 7.70 2.85 5.71 0.14 13.69 1.14 38.37 11.13 19.54 3.71 -6.70 
LTU 1995 35.72 21.70 9.95 8.44 0.36 1.06 3.34 34.12 8.68 12.43 7.46 1.60 
HUN 1992 51.24 26.73 13.32 18.81 9.60 2.04 1.67 46.65 9.84 17.40 18.20 4.59 
MLT 1998 42.65 19.83 14.28 12.45 3.18 2.16 4.89 32.83 7.81 11.33 7.37 9.82 
POL 1991 47.71 24.34 9.75 16.33 4.36 2.49 2.69 43.30 11.01 14.96 10.67 4.41 
SVN 2000 48.14 19.30 11.64 17.01 2.48 1.53 3.13 44.30 7.54 16.29 14.96 3.83 
SVK 1993 77.59 25.20 10.97 13.82 2.71 4.47 5.44 46.85 9.77 13.22 12.33 30.74 
ROM 1998 45.24 14.53 8.57 10.09 4.34 1.78 1.87 44.20 8.10 13.50 9.10 1.04 
BGR 1991  19.01 7.74 14.00 16.43 1.99 2.21  22.55 9.58 10.02  
NMS  46.02 19.87 9.87 12.21 3.99 3.01 3.26 40.84 10.70 13.70 10.57 5.18 
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Table A3 – Fiscal variables, end of the sample: 2006.  (% of GDP) 
 
 Public spending Public revenue 
 Tot Cons Emp SocTr Int Sub Inv Tot Dirtax Indtax SocC 
Deficit 
 
BEL 49.15 22.63 11.99 15.71 4.17 1.81 1.71 49.30 16.72 13.32 15.91 -0.15 
DEU 45.71 18.49 7.26 18.60 2.81 1.13 1.41 43.99 10.84 12.14 17.38 1.71 
GRC 46.06 15.78 11.95 17.65 4.87 0.13 3.65 43.15 8.68 13.05 14.92 2.91 
ESP 38.45 17.94 10.01 11.58 1.64 0.99 3.87 40.25 11.72 12.33 12.96 -1.80 
FRA 53.78 23.67 13.20 17.91 2.59 1.46 3.38 51.20 11.91 15.51 18.45 2.58 
IRL 34.05 15.92 9.32 8.15 0.99 0.52 3.86 36.92 13.10 14.00 6.18 -2.87 
ITA 50.10 20.30 11.05 17.15 4.62 0.92 2.29 45.62 14.48 14.79 13.02 4.48 
LUX 40.42 15.93 7.71 13.99 0.16 1.60 4.07 40.52 13.23 12.58 11.00 -0.09 
NLD 46.67 25.30 9.43 11.21 2.33 1.14 3.34 47.22 11.83 12.91 15.29 -0.55 
AUT 49.20 17.90 9.28 18.34 2.85 3.19 1.05 47.95 13.16 14.02 16.01 1.25 
PRT 46.15 20.75 13.50 15.09 2.81 1.38 2.29 42.24 8.85 15.35 12.46 3.90 
FIN 48.56 21.40 13.29 15.89 1.54 1.25 2.62 52.33 17.11 13.62 12.31 -3.76 
DNK 50.90 25.54 17.05 15.32 1.72 2.24 1.82 55.12 29.47 17.80 1.96 -4.22 
SWE 55.38 26.74 15.65 16.69 1.81 1.61 3.16 57.49 19.98 17.05 13.17 -2.11 
GBR 44.96 22.30 11.49 13.02 2.11 0.54 1.85 42.10 17.30 12.96 8.40 2.86 
EU15 46.64 20.71 11.48 15.09 2.47 1.33 2.69 46.36 14.56 14.10 12.63 0.28 
CZE 42.48 21.59 7.82 11.37 1.10 1.94 5.06 39.55 8.77 10.99 15.04 2.93 
EST 33.20 16.73 8.89 8.98 0.15 0.95 3.58 36.97 7.24 13.42 10.44 -3.77 
CYP 43.93 17.90 14.79 12.31 3.26 0.54 3.30 42.40 10.92 17.77 8.02 1.54 
LVA 36.95 16.91 10.14 8.02 0.46 0.64 3.36 37.37 8.42 12.74 8.93 -0.42 
LTU 33.59 17.34 10.52 8.58 0.45 0.71 4.16 33.32 9.68 11.21 8.81 0.28 
HUN 52.96 22.78 12.07 15.08 3.94 1.26 4.48 43.73 9.45 15.09 12.78 9.24 
MLT 45.22 21.11 13.85 12.96 3.65 1.93 4.63 42.67 12.26 15.50 7.98 2.55 
POL 43.59 17.91 9.80 15.46 2.46 0.80 4.17 39.64 7.56 13.99 12.27 3.95 
SVN 47.03 19.57 11.96 16.31 1.66 1.64 3.38 45.55 9.05 16.10 15.10 1.48 
SVK 46.25 19.26 11.65 15.97 1.56 1.61 3.67 44.85 9.35 15.58 14.91 1.40 
ROM 37.32 18.18 7.46 12.05 1.38 1.35 2.22 33.94 5.90 11.48 12.12 3.39 
BGR 32.02 18.01 8.85 8.20 0.76 1.39 2.85 30.14 5.19 12.16 10.18 1.88 
NMS 44.96 18.94 10.65 12.11 1.74 1.23 3.74 42.74 8.65 13.84 11.38 2.22 
EU27 45.89 19.92 11.11 13.76 2.14 1.28 3.16 44.75 11.93 13.98 12.07 1.14 
 
 
Table A4 – Functional distribution of public expenditure, beginning of the sub-sample 





































BEL 1990 12.50 1.85 1.10 5.58 0.46 0.28 5.01 0.71 5.43 16.73 49.64 
DEU 1991 6.33 1.75 1.43 5.07 0.94 0.93 5.53 0.83 3.93 17.37 44.11 
GRC 1990 31.24 8.33 0.02 8.01 0.25 0.23 1.78 0.11 5.93 29.00 84.91 
ESP 1999 5.99 1.12 1.84 4.47 0.88 1.11 5.20 1.43 4.43 13.26 39.74 
FRA 1995 8.22 2.56 1.27 3.95 0.59 1.55 6.56 1.08 6.65 22.31 54.75 
IRL 1990 9.99 1.40 1.75 5.82  1.74 5.78 0.45 4.87 12.13 43.92 
ITA 1990 16.35 1.86 2.55 7.52 0.98 1.67 7.89 0.98 6.99 20.53 67.30 
LUX 1990 4.58 0.76 0.75 5.17 1.11 0.89 4.18 1.14 4.28 14.89 37.75 
NLD 1995 10.48 1.91 1.42 4.81 0.95 6.26 3.75 1.21 5.26 20.40 56.45 
AUT 1995 9.07 1.00 1.51 5.01 1.39 1.04 7.66 1.16 6.28 21.94 56.05 
PRT 1990 10.49 1.86 2.10 5.55 0.36 0.80 3.77 0.75 4.90 9.37 39.95 
FIN 1990 5.30 1.53 1.28 6.38 0.24 0.69 5.78 1.45 6.23 19.05 47.91 
DNK 1990 11.22 1.98 1.07 4.63 0.28 0.54 6.64 1.52 6.97 21.06 55.91 
SWE 1995 12.00 2.47 1.42 6.02 0.17 2.82 6.31 1.87 7.08 26.91 67.08 
GBR 1990 5.06 4.10 2.11 4.21 0.52 1.47 5.12 1.03 4.71 13.99 42.31 





Table A5 – Functional Distribution of Public Expenditure at the end of the sub-sample 
























Education Social Protection Total 
BEL 2005 9.06 1.10 1.65 4.86 0.60 0.35 7.07 1.29 6.09 17.86 49.91 
DEU 2005 6.12 1.10 1.61 3.47 0.50 1.00 6.22 0.64 4.15 21.96 46.79 
GRC 2005 8.78 2.83 1.29 5.35 0.66 0.45 4.64 0.36 2.74 19.57 46.66 
ESP 2005 4.59 1.09 1.83 4.58 0.88 0.86 5.69 1.42 4.41 12.88 38.25 
FRA 2005 7.23 1.92 1.39 2.91 0.82 1.83 7.34 1.49 6.18 22.67 53.78 
IRL 2004 3.53 0.56 1.41 5.03  2.00 7.16 0.51 4.53 9.21 33.93 
ITA 2005 8.75 1.49 1.96 3.80 0.77 0.76 6.86 0.82 4.74 18.09 48.05 
LUX 2006 4.55 0.26 0.99 4.66 1.07 0.63 4.96 1.78 4.82 16.70 40.42 
NLD 2005 7.83 1.40 1.75 4.58 0.85 1.15 4.36 1.43 5.14 16.96 45.46 
AUT 2005 6.89 0.88 1.45 5.04 0.36 0.57 6.92 1.00 5.98 20.78 49.89 
PRT 2005 6.85 1.35 2.02 4.30 0.55 0.63 7.18 1.13 7.42 15.78 47.20 
FIN 2005 6.77 1.65 1.52 4.65 0.33 0.24 6.85 1.20 6.06 21.21 50.48 
DNK 2006 6.48 1.57 1.00 3.57 0.52 0.59 7.00 1.55 7.60 21.49 51.37 
SWE 2005 7.70 1.74 1.34 5.11 0.41 0.93 6.99 1.09 7.32 23.79 56.43 
GBR 2005 4.90 2.55 2.57 2.79 1.01 0.95 7.12 0.90 5.81 15.99 44.61 
EU 15  6.67 1.43 1.58 4.31 0.62 0.86 6.42 1.11 5.53 18.33 46.88 
 
 
Table A6 – Correlation matrix for fiscal variables  
 






















edu PE ss 
PEtot 1.00               
PEcons 0.73 1.00              
PEemp 0.72 0.75 1.00             
PEsoc 0.82 0.50 0.40 1.00            
PEsub 0.52 0.45 0.40 0.50 1.00           
PEinv -0.28 -0.30 -0.13 -0.36 -0.14 1.00          
PRtot 0.84 0.82 0.69 0.74 0.61 -0.27 1.00         
PRdirtax 0.44 0.64 0.61 0.34 0.46 -0.39 0.69 1.00        
PRindtax 0.56 0.57 0.76 0.39 0.32 -0.19 0.65 0.57 1.00       
PRsoc 0.21 0.00 -0.31 0.36 0.03 0.08 0.09 -0.57 -0.36 1.00      
Pdefic 0.32 -0.11 0.08 0.18 -0.12 -0.04 -0.24 -0.41 -0.15 0.22 1.00     
PEeco -0.08 -0.34 -0.29 -0.09 -0.04 0.41 -0.25 -0.57 -0.48 0.47 0.29 1.00    
PEhlth -0.08 -0.08 -0.28 0.08 -0.05 0.02 -0.09 -0.43 -0.28 0.58 0.01 0.50 1.00   
PEedu 0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.02 -0.45 -0.16 0.59 0.15 0.60 0.79 1.00  
PEss 0.31 0.01 -0.18 0.47 -0.01 0.11 0.16 -0.47 -0.18 0.80 0.28 0.54 0.58 0.69 1.00 
 
 
Table A7 – Correlation coefficients between fiscal variables and dependent and control 
variables  
 



























Logpc GDP -0.52 -0.55 -0.22 -0.61 -0.29 0.29 -0.55 -0.12 -0.23 -0.53 -0.09 0.14 -0.35 -0.26 -0.62 
Log LAB -0.44 -0.49 -0.14 -0.55 -0.19 0.31 -0.51 -0.09 -0.24 -0.52 -0.01 0.19 -0.35 -0.21 -0.55 
TFP -0.04 -0.20 -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.21 -0.13 0.03 -0.10 -0.06 0.12 -0.10 0.00 -0.18 -0.08 
PrivInv -0.28 -0.30 -0.11 -0.31 0.16 0.18 -0.24 -0.42 -0.19 0.10 -0.13 0.16 -0.04 -0.07 -0.36 
Tot 0.24 0.05 0.01 0.28 0.20 0.05 0.26 0.14 -0.02 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.28 0.10 0.28 
labfgr -0.59 -0.50 -0.40 -0.52 -0.36 0.25 -0.41 -0.14 -0.12 -0.32 -0.44 -0.08 -0.21 -0.32 -0.52 






Tables and figures 
 
 
Table 1 – The relation of public expenditures and taxation types with alterative 
measures of economic growth 
 











n good  (G4) 
Consumpti
on tax  
( cτ ) 
Labour 
Income 
Tax ( lτ ) 
Corporate 
profits  
( πτ ) 
GDP gr + + + Only short term eff. 
Only short 
term eff. - - 
Lab. Prod gr + + - Only short term eff. 
Only short 
term eff. + - 
TFP gr. + No effect No effect No effect No effect No effect No effect 
 
Note: Those relationships are computed assuming values for the parameters as in the underlying model. In 




































Table 2 – Summary of some of the empirical literature 
Autor (s) Data period and 
coverage 










forward moving average 
dep. Variable) 












capita GDP growth rate 
For developed countries concludes that debt-
financing increases in expenditure have no effects 
on growth, but tax-financing increases do. 












Negative effect distortionary taxation 
Negative impact non productive expenditures 
(social transfers) 






Pooled Mean Group 
Estimator (dynamic 
equation in levels) 
Positive impact of public investment  
Unclear effect of public current expenditure. 







Two-way FE, dynamic 
model (5-averages in 
static and levels in 
dynamic model) 
Negative effect of distortionary taxation, positive 
effect  of productive expenditure 
Odedokun 
(2001) 
103 countries in 
4 groups, yearly 
data, 1970-1998 
Fixed-effects (Five-year 
moving average of dep. 
var.) 
Negative effect of current exp. And no significant 
effect of capital 
Negative impact of public consumption and 
wages 
Negative impact of defence, health, economic 







Fixed-country and period 
effects (five-year 
averages) 
Significant negative effect for total government 









OLS, 3SLS. (Decade 
average dep var.)  
Identify the importance of education and 
government spending for economic growth in 
their set of countries. Also find a significant 








estimated by F-E 
(variables in levels) 
Negative impact of total expenditure on growth. 
Positive impact of direct taxation, indirect 
taxation and public investment.  
Negative effect of government consumption, 










Bond, IV (dep. var. in 
levels) 
They highlight the impact of an equilibrated 
budget.  
Negative impact of public wages on growth. 
Reed (2006) US States, 
1970-1999 
F-E (5-year averaged 
data) 











Table 3 – Descriptive statistics for the full panel sample 
 
 EU 15 EU New member states 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables       
Pc GDP gr. 
(log) 525 0.0834 .054 
-.087 
(LUX,1975) 
.278      










(PRT,1977) 163 0.2135 .338 




TFPgr (log) 400 0.0122 .019 -.086 (ESP,1974) 
.090 
(FIN,1973)      
Moving Aver. 
GDP 525 0.0209 .013 
-.017      
(FIN, 1989) 
.083 
(IRL,1994) 187 0.0358 .032 
-.094    
(LTU, 1990) 
.104    
(LVA,2004) 
Public Expenditure (economic classification), % of GDP 
Total 538 0.4615 .088 .186        (PRT, 1971) 
.724 
(SWE,1993) 131 0.4192 .067 
.244 
(LVA,1992) 
.775     
(SVK, 993) 
Consumption 
538 0.1962 .041 




(SWE,1981) 199 0.1919 .033 
.077     
(LVA, 
1990) 
.287   
(HUN,1993) 
Compensation 
of  employees 538 0.1178 .028 .060 (LUX,1973) 
.200 
(SWE,1980) 153 0.1036 .022 
.028     
(LVA, 
1990) 
.155    
(CYP,2003) 
Social 










538 0.0215 .011 









Investment 538 0.0314 .009 .005          (GBR,2005) 
.057 





Public Revenues, % of GDP 
Total  538 0.4347 .086 .205 (PRT,1973) 
.622 






taxation 538 0.1344 .057 




















taxation 538 0.1294 .024 
.057          
(ESP, 1978) 
.182 





           
Public deficit 538 0.0268 .041 -.077 (FIN,1976) 
.157 





Public Expenditure (functional classification) , % of GDP 
Econ. Affairs 211 0..0474 .012  .015 (GRC,1994) 
.115 
(DEU,1998)      
Health 211 0 .0585 .012 .011 (GRC,1994) 
.081 
(ITA,1991)      
Education 211 0.0555 .012  .027 (GRC,2005) 
 .082 
(DNK,2003)      
Social 




(GRC,1990)      
Control variables 
Private Invest. 






trade 538 99.75 8.71 
63.91   
(ESP,1983) 
131.08 















Population gr. 525 0.0052 .012 -.004 (DEU,1976) 
.264 






Note:  BEL -Belgium; DEU - Germany ; GRC - Greece; FRA - France; ESP - Spain; ITA - Italy; IRL - Ireland; LUX - 
Luxembourg; AUT - Austria; NLD - Netherlands; PRT - Portugal; FIN - Finland; DNK - Denmark; SWE - Sweden; GBR - United 
Kingdom; CZE - Czech Republic; EST - Estonia; CYP - Cyprus; LVA - Latvia; LTU - Lithuania; HUN - Hungary; MLT - Malta; 
POL - Poland; SVN - Slovenia; SVK - Slovakia; ROM - Romania; BGR - Bulgaria. 
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Table 4 – 1971-2006, EU15. Long-term coefficients, dependent variable: logrpcGDP 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PE consumption -0.7522*** 
(.225) 
     
PE 




    
PE social 
transfers 
  -0.2976** 
(.154) 
   
PE subsidies   .3222      
(.240) 
   
PE Investment    0.6464** 
(.327) 
  






    -0.0481 (.219)  
PR social 
contributions 





     0.2896     
(.225) 













0.1166     
(.103) 




























































Observations 432 432 432 432 432 432 
 
Notes: GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 





















Table 5 – 1971-1989, EU15. Long-term coefficients, dependent variable: logrpcGDP 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PE consumption -0.6479  (.469)      
PE compensation 
of  employees 
 1.0580** 
(.471) 
    
PE social 
transfers 
  -0.7007** 
(.287) 
   
PE subsidies   0.9096** 
(.378) 
   
PE Investment    1.3285*** 
(.500) 
  






    -0.2088 (.348)  
PR social 
contributions 
    -0.4652 (.488)  
PR Indirect 
taxation 
     0.3787 (.349) 















0.0023   (.001) 0.0026   (.001) 0.0002   (.001) 0.0017  (.001) 0.0021 (.001) 0.0027 (.001) 














0.3143    
(.204) 
0.2446    
(.192) 0.1241   (.189)















Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 
 
Notes: GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 























Table 6 – 1990-2006, EU15. Long-term coefficients, dependent variable: logrpcGDP 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PEconsumption -1.0453*** 
(.359) 
     
PE compensation 
of  employees 
 -1.1620*** 
(.399) 
    
PE social 
transfers 
  -0.8380*** 
(.197) 
   
PE subsidies   0.5400     
(.530) 
   
PE Investment    -0.6913 (.454)   















     0.8204** 
(.360) 
PR total 0.0762 (.169) -0.1427   
(.137) 
0.1773   (.143) -0.3910*** 
(.103) 
  
Public deficit 0.2275 (.145) 0.1490   (.113) 0.2433** (.118) 
0.2395*** 
(.087) 




0.0014   (.001) 0.0032** 
(.001) 






0.0028*   
(.001) 














-0.0653 (.210) 0.0583     
(.178) 
0.0992     
(.178) 
-0.0590    
(.175) 
0.1664     
(.215) 














Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208 
 
Notes: GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 






















Table 7 – 5-year moving averages 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PE consumption -0.2016*** 
(.055) 
     
PE 




    
PE social 
transfers 
  0.0348 
(.043) 
   
PE subsidies   -0.2832*** 
(.062) 
   
PE Investment    -0.0346 
(.074) 
  
















     -0.1180** 
(.053) 














































































8.10         
(.0000) 
11.23         
(.0000) 
10.75         
(.0000) 
9.03          
(.0000) 
 8.03         
(.0000) 
9.53          
(.0000) 
Observations 458 458 458 458 458 458 
 
Notes: GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 


















Table 8 – EU15  1971-2006. Long-term coefficients. Labour Productivity as dependent 
variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PEconsumption -0.7524*** 
(.201) 
     
PE  compensation 
of employees 
 -0.0465   
(.261) 
    
PE social transfers   -0.4112*** 
(.126) 
   
PE subsidies   0.3116     
(.196) 
   
PE Investment    0.9010*** 
(.296) 
  
PE total     -0.3130*** (.098) 
-0.5904*** 
(.070) 










     0.2916   
(.199) 









Public deficit 0.2590*** 
(.085) 
0.0500     
(.079) 
0.1103     
(.084) 












































Population growth 0.1726    
(.179) 








0.2231    
(.194) 
Observations 429 429 429 429 443 443 
 
Notes: GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 





















Table 9 – EU15 1971-2006. Long-term coefficients. Total Factor Productivity growth as 
dependent variable. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PEconsumption -0.3382*** 
(.122) 
     
PE compensation 
of  employees 
 -0.4225*** 
(.132) 
    
PE social 
transfers 
  0.1227   
(.077) 
   
PE subsidies   0.0901   
(.148) 
   
PE Investment    -0.3840***    
(.147) 
  
PE total     0.0687    (.064) 














     0.0347    
(.094) 




-0.0082    
(.041) 
0.0435    
(.030) 
  




-0.0235    
(.058) 
0.0598    
(.037) 
-0.0677   
(.076) 






























0.0784    
(.086) 
0.0841    
(.086) 
0.0739    
(.093) 
0.0934    
(.089) 
0.0400    
(.093) 




0.2179    
(.255) 
0.1863    
(.247) 
0.0300    
(.284) 
0.0432    
(.254) 
0.0899    
(.261) 
0.1552    
(.264) 
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 
 
Notes: GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 
























Table 10 – Classification of public expenditure according to its impact on alternative 
measures of economic growth 
 














( cτ ) 
Labour 
Income 
( lτ ) 
Corporate 
profits ( πτ ) 
PE cons (-) 
PE emp (-) 
 
PE inv (-) 
PE cons (-) 
PE emp (+) 
 





PE emp  




PR Ind. tax 
 PR social 
contr. (-) 
 
Note: We have taken into account the 5 percent significance levels to elaborate this table. Short-run 




Table 11 – 1990-2006, EU New Member States. Long-term coefficients, dependent 
variable: logrpcGDP 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PEconsumption -2.1529*** 
(.713) 
     
PE compensation 
of  employees 
 -6.1303*** 
(1.35) 
    
PE social 
transfers 
  -2.6550*** 
(.664) 
   
PE subsidies   -5.6468*** 
(1.59) 
   
PE Investment    -0.8509   
(1.69) 
  















     -3.0067** 
(1.22) 









Public deficit 0.2049     
(.541) 
0.7727*   
(.458) 
-0.2496    
(.311) 








-0.0012     
(.003) 
-0.0001    
(.002) 
-0.0003    
(.002) 
0.0027    
(.003) 
-0.0007   
(.002) 
0.0022     
(.003) 
Terms of trade 0.0011      
(.002) 
0.0026     
(.001) 
0.0020     
(.001) 








0.6654      
(.486) 
0.6760*    
(.375) 
0.4936     
(.316) 
0.5662    
(.515) 
0.4088     
(.379) 






-3.1397    
(2.18) 
-0.9116    
(1.85) 
-2.3032   
(3.01) 
-3.3242   
(2.41) 
-0.8210   
(2.86) 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 
 
Notes: GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 





Table 12 – EU15 1990-2006. Long-term coefficients. Functional categories of public 
expenditure. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PE Econ. Affairs 0.1144 
(.326) 
   0.5313** 
(.234) 
PE Health  -1.1363*** 
(.344) 
  -1.4969*** 
(.317) 










































































Observations 181 181 181 181 181 
 
Notes: GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation. The standard deviations are in parentheses. 


































Figure 1 – per capita GDP and per capita fiscal variables 
(Fiscal variables in thousand Euro per capita, current prices. GDP in thousand Euro per capita, 




































































































































































































___   A (Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Spain and Finland)  
___   B (Belgium, Germany, France and Italy) 
___   difference (B-A) 
 
  
 
 
